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After the carnage and destruction of World War II, the international community was
eager to find a less violent alternative to war. States began to use diplomatic and coercive
techniques to try and resolve differences or effect changes in the international system. Some
tools have proven more successful than others, but one that has gained great popularity is the
threat and imposition of economic sanctions. Despite the apparent ineffectiveness of imposing
sanctions, they are widely threatened and used by states in the system.
Some scholars have suggested that sanctions are doing more than meets the eye (Drezner
2003). Sanctions may indeed be a signaling mechanism that states use to indicate where they
stand on an issue or the foreign policy of another state. We agree with this analysis, but find
current explanations of sanctions episodes inadequate. In order to make the argument that states
use sanctions as a signaling mechanism it is necessary to know something about the states and
their position in the international community. We employ network analysis to understand what
international trade networks look like and to determine which actors in the network are utilizing
sanctions and who they are sanctioning. This helps us to get a better handle on what exactly it is
that states are trying to do when they impose sanctions.
We argue that sanctions more than simply signals of states' policy preferences. Indeed,
sanctions are a tool that central states use to promote regimes and enforce norms within those
regimes. A sanction against a partner state within a trade regime, for example, flags a violation
of norms and thereby strengthens the norm and the regime.
We test our explanation using a logistic regression on thirty years of sanctions episodes.
In support of our theory, we find that the most economically central states are threatening and
imposing as well as receiving sanctions at an exponential rate compared to non-central states.
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This indicates that the central states, those with the greatest interest in creating and maintaining
regimes are also those that seem most eager to enforce regimes and those most likely to be
punished for violations.
Literature Review
Why use sanctions?
Sanctions have long been a topic of interest for scholars of international relations, often
falling under the policy umbrella of economic statecraft (Lasswell 1945; Wallensteen 1968;
Baldwin 1985). Economic statecraft is a term which describes the attempt to pursue state goals
through economic means. There are several different ways of characterizing sanctions. Some
argue that economic sanctions are, at their very heart, an influence attempt. Economic sanctions
are a tool of coercion, in which the sender state disrupts the flow of trade or capital in an effort to
change an undesirable policy in the target state (see Wallensteen 1968; Baldwin 1985; Drezner
2003). This differs from other scholars who see economic sanctions as a method of punishment
towards the target state for an action or policy (Nossal 1998). Other authors view the use of
sanctions as more of a signaling attempt to show that the sender state is serious in its intentions
to coerce the target state to change its policies (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988 and 1992; Drury
1998; and Hiscox 2000 Verdier 2004). We follow the latter argument. Despite the fact that
sanctions have been found time and time again to be ineffective in changing the undesired policy
of the receiving state (see Wallensteen 1968; Pape 1997, 1998; Elliot 1998; Hufbauer et al.
2007), they continue to be utilized with increasing frequency by some states in the system.
There are, however, some contestations to the theory. Drezner (2003) argues that if
sanctions are more of a signaling mechanism, then there is a selection bias in effect. This seems
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to make sense with economic sanctions, where the threat is more likely to work than the actual
imposition. Baldwin (1985) echoes this sentiment: “Thus, economic sanctions may not be
effective because of their economic impact, which may be nil, but rather because of the signal
they send about the intentions of the state imposing the sanctions” (24). Baldwin further argues
that the 16 problems he identifies with economic sanctions are in fact problems with most
statecraft, economic or otherwise.
If sanctions are signals, then what are they signaling?
Verdier (2004) argues that sanctions are important purveyors of private information. As
implied above, sanctions tell receiving states that they have offended the sender in some way.
We argue that sanctions help perpetuate international norms both in the economic and in the
political realm. Norm-breaking behavior is recognized because it elicits some sort of disapproval
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Furthermore, regime theory has pointed to sanctions as a method
of enforcing the “rules of the game” (Kehohane and Nye 1973; Kehohane 1984). In fact, some
international institutions, such as the WTO, utilize sanctions as enforcement mechanisms. In the
economic realm, it can be argued that free trade is the norm and disapproval for such normbreaking behavior as tariffs and subsidies is displayed through economic sanctions. In the
political realm, there are norms about how states should be governed and how they treat one
another. Sanctions are often implemented for human rights abuses, civil wars, and offenses
against a neighbor’s sovereignty. Martin (1993) specifically looks at international cooperation
on international sanctions and notes that, despite the fact that groups of states may agree on
predetermined rules, norms, etc., it is generally up to one state to initiate sanctions on behalf of
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all. It can be quite difficult to convince states to band together and impose multilateral sanctions,
especially if there are any questions regarding the credibility of their threat.
Who sends and receives sanctions?
While it is implied that certain types of states are more and less likely to sanction and be
sanctioned, little empirical research has been done on the subject. In their case study approach,
Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot (2007) suggest that sanctions are imposed largely by big powers
which pursue “an active foreign policy” (5). They also argue that while the sender state is
usually large and powerful, the target state is generally small and weak (89). Indeed, “the
sender’s GNP is more than 10 times greater than the target’s GNP in 80 percent of cases, and in
half the cases, the ratio is greater than 100” (89). They utilize, however, only descriptive
statistics, and their analysis only focuses on sanctions imposed for political, rather than economic
reasons.
We argue that a social network approach is the best way to understand who uses
sanctions and who receives them. Social network analysis allows us to determine not only the
direct relationship between two states, or direct affinity, but also their structural affinity, or “the
extent to which any two states are equivalent (or similar) to each other in terms of their attitudes
toward the traits they share, or their relations with all other states in the system” (Maoz et al.
2006). Though network analysis has not yet been used extensively in the field of international
relations, arguments have been made for its inherent usefulness (see Hafner-Burton and
Montgomery 2008). Especially useful is the concept of centrality, or the importance of
relationships (Scott 2000; Wasserman and Faust 1994). Rather than “big” or “powerful” states
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generally being the sender, and “small” or “weak” states generally being the target in a sanctions
episode, we are looking at the relationship through the lens of centrality.

Theory
Our basic theory is that trade networks form regimes with particular norms and a high
degree of structural affinity. When states engage in norm-breaking behavior, others threaten or
impose sanctions in order to solidify the regime and enforce established customs. Therefore,
sanctions episodes simply re-emphasize group norms and solidify expectations of how
centralized states will act in the future. Peripheral states, which are not involved in the actions of
the regime, will not be sanctioned because there is limited structural similarity with the
centralized core. The remainder of the theory section investigates the utility of the trade
centrality network, its structure, and how its activities relate to the process of sanctions episodes,
both politically-based and economically-based.
Utility of the Liberal Trade Network
States do not engage with regimes unless they gain a minimum threshold of utility from
doing so. More centralized states have incentives to create norms for trade because of the vast
array of states with which they might trade. By creating rules, states can engage in commerce
with relatively limited uncertainty and, therefore, risk. The potential negative externalities of
unilaterally lowering trade barriers are offset by the reciprocal openness of trade partners.
Indeed, the regime depends on reciprocation of liberal economic norms by trading states. On a
functional level, the internationalization of the production chain depends largely on the relatively
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free movement of goods between states (Garrett 1998, 792). More ideally, however, the
connected core pursues trade openness as a key pillar of a policy environment conducive to
normative economic and political goals (Ruggie 1982). With a larger number of states in the
network, each state has less individualized leverage on each other state than it would without the
aid of norms created and enforced by the regime. Consequently, a reinforcing mechanism exists
whereby openness begets openness and is enforced organically through the functioning of the
regime.
The “oughtness,” described by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) and created by the lowering
of trade barriers and engagement in free trade also can follow the functionalist argument into
areas of political engagement. Liberal economics can spread into the political realm in such
areas as how states govern their people (e.g. democracy) and how they treat their citizens (e.g.
certain human rights standards). On a functional level, civil discord affects trade (see Collier
2007). Consequently, central states receive positive utility when stability-inducing norms are
actively followed. Stable states enable stable trade, which in turn may promote higher profits for
corporations and their respective states. On a more normative plain, trade ties may allow norms
to diffuse between partners. For example, the proliferation of labor rights norms is directly
connected to and relatable with trade ties (Greenhill, Mosely, and Prakash 2009).
Less centralized states, on the other hand, are either peripheral to the core trade regime or
relegated to “norm takers” in the international system. Being less connected to the global
economy with less expansive trade networks, peripheral states do not possess the leverage or
interest in shaping trade regimes. First, the relative paucity of their alternative trade outlets
diminishes the overall utility of coercion for less central states. Less central states do not have as
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many outlets as more central states to divert trade lost from sanctions episodes (sending or
receiving), for example, meaning economic norm enforcement is more difficult. Furthermore,
having fewer trade connections implicitly limits the diffusion of norms to a smaller network of
trade partners. As a result, peripheral, less connected states are less able to shape norms and
more apt to accept through incentive or coercion the economic norms of the centralized regime.
Structure of the Network
The structure of the network is best described by Keohane and Nye’s (2000) concept of
the “issue-structural” model (50-51). In this model, regime structures are determined by stronger
states as opposed to weaker ones. While there may be some debate regarding the necessity of a
hegemon to create trade regimes, for the purposes of this project it is sufficient to simply
acknowledge that more powerful forces have a disproportionate impact on the rules created
within the regime. This makes intuitive sense as the most centralized states have the most at risk
when it comes to the enforcement and regulation of these norms. If a state trades with more
partners, it cannot directly control as many facets of its trade relationships, given a normative
environment that emphasizes reciprocal openness.
From a network analysis paradigm, we look at the one-mode network of trade between
states. Our actors are states and the relational tie, as well as mode, is trade. We investigate the
centrality of trade as our relational variable. Centrality in this instance refers to monadic degree
with respect to the number of trade partners. Exact measurements are specified in the
conceptualization and operationalization section. The effects of expansiveness and popularity
jointly are considered in terms of sanctions threat and/or implementation. More centralized states
can be considered the core of this network and less centralized states comprise the periphery.

8

We predict a form of structural affinity (see Maoz et al. 2006) based on economic ties
plays a large part in how centralized states act towards one another. Less centralized states that
lack this structural affinity to central states will act differently than the central states, particularly
in regards to the punishment mechanism of the trade regime. Similarities in structural affinity
increase the likelihood of developing direct, bilateral affinity. This direct affinity ensures the
creation of certain norms, such as low trade barriers or observing human rights (as indicated
above).
Activities of the Network
Because the network creates these norms, it also helps to create processes for dealing
with norm-breaking behavior. In this case, the punishment for norm-breaking behavior is
economic sanction. The economic sanction can serve as a signal that another state is not
conforming to the rules set forth by the central trade network and will continue to be punished
until it comports with the norm. By offering this signal, the sender state is also re-emphasizing its
commitment to the regime at the international level. It is willing to engage in some sort of
penalty, either economic or reputational with regards to the offending state, in order to continue
the rules and norms set forth by the regime. Indeed, economic statecraft is often employed by the
highly interdependent and connected core against fellow members in pursuit of commercial and
political objectives (Mastanduno 1998). Furthermore, central states are better able to divert
losses from sanctions episodes given that their expansive trade networks are able to absorb
surplus goods. Sanctions are therefore a viable and potentially attractive option for coercive
tactics. This leads to our first hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 1: More centralized states will be more likely to threaten or issue sanctions than
less centralized states.
Centralized states will also be more likely to be sanctioned because of their involvement
in the regime itself. Because centralized states are expected to conform to the norms, they are
more likely to be held accountable when they do not comport with them than less centralized
states. Furthermore, the salience of central states to the trade regime, both in substantive and
normative contexts, means potential sanction sending states accrue greater utility from coercive
actions against other core members. While action may be taken against the core, it nets less
overall utility than enforcing norms against the core. The functioning of sanctions as primarily a
signaling mechanism that a centralized state can withstand also means episodes likely do not
threaten the long-term functioning of the regime. The overall relationship is likely to be slightly
less strong than the sender-based relationship because of norm transfusion between the different
states; however, we expect that it will be a statistically significant finding.
Hypothesis 2: More centralized states will be more likely to be threatened with or to receive
sanctions than less centralized states.
As stated above, there are a variety of reasons to believe that the norms in the trade
centrality network transcend the simply economic aspects and include more politically based
norms as well. There are economic reasons for states to encourage stability-inducing political
norms in order to assure stable trade. There are also opportunities for direct affinity to encourage
norm transfusion.

10

Hypothesis 3: The effects of trade centrality on politically-motivated sanctions should be
similar to those created for economically-motivated sanctions.
This, in short, means that the trade networks regime is actually significantly more powerful
than simply facilitating more open trade. It actually attempts to impose economic and political
stability within the network itself through sanctions. This issuance of sanctions helps re-enforce
the importance of the regime and conforming to its expected behavior. Therefore, sanctions may
work but only in the promulgation and perpetuation of the regime itself.

Conceptualization and Operationalization

We empirically test our theory of centrality and sanctions using a large-N statistical study.
Our unit of analysis is directed dyad years extending from 1970 to 2000 based largely on the
availability of sanctions data but also corresponding with the proliferation of trade networks after
Bretton Woods collapsed. Directed dyads offer a more complete picture of sanctions dynamics
by considering the characteristics of both sending and receiving states. Furthermore, employing
this strategy better captures the strategic nature of sanctions episodes in that the traits of the
receiving state are likely to influence the behavior of the prospective sending state.
The dependent variable in our analysis is the threat or imposition of an economic sanction
in a given year for a particular dyad. Conceptually, economic sanctions are coercive actions
taken by a state to restrict economic exchange with a target in an attempt to compel policy
changes (Morgan, Krustev and Bapat 2006). States employ economic sanctions as a political
tool in a range of both political and economic policy arenas. The dynamics between economic
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and political sanctions, however, may be different in context of our theory. In other words,
centrality may affect the opportunity and willingness of states uniquely depending on the issue
area. Consequently, we employ the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES)
dataset which includes sanctions episodes disaggregated by political and economic motivations
(Morgan, Krustev and Bapat 2006). In total, once data availability is considered, our dataset
contains 886 total dyadic sanctions episodes of which 565 are economically motivated and 321
are politically motivated.
Economic centrality is the primary independent variable for this study and is simply the
degree to which a state is connected to others and, implicitly, the global economy. As we
employ it, a state’s centrality measure captures its nodal degree, or the number of lines incident
with the node, as a ratio of all possible connections (Faust and Wasserman 1994):

.
Where L is a line incident to a particular node i and g is the number of total possible lines.
A more central state will have economic linkages with a larger number of states than one that is
less central. Although sanctions can take a number of economic forms, we consider trade
centrality an appropriate measure for capturing the essence of a highly connected country. We
therefore operationalize this variable using trade data obtained from Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins
(2008). In the above equation, the numerator measures the number of trade partners a state has
(at any level of trade) while the denominator measures the total possible trade partners.
Centrality in its raw form, therefore, is bounded between 0 and 1. However, visual inspection of
the data and initial results indicates a polynomial relationship between centrality and sanctions
behavior such that propensity to sanction increases exponentially with centrality. As such, after
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transforming the centrality to a 100 point scale, we include a squared term to more appropriately
assay the influence of our primary explanatory variable. Centrality variables are included for
both the potential sender and receiver state in a dyad.
We include a number of control variables to account for alternative explanations of
sanctions behavior. First, sanctions are often considered an alternative to militarized conflict in
that they are meant to coerce states without inviting the potentially high cost of war (Wallensteen
1968; Baldwin 1985; Pape 1997). In this light, it is necessary to control for potentially
substitutable policies, namely war. Greater power disparities may more often lead to militarized
responses rather than economic responses by the stronger power. We include a variable
controlling for the relative power distribution between states in a dyad using the composite index
of national capabilities (CINC) scores, which conglomerate total population, urbanization,
military personnel, military expenditure, energy consumption, and iron and steel production into
a single measure (Singer 1987). Second, it might be expected that allies sanction each other less
than non-allies given their security relationship. Cox and Drury, however, find that allies may be
more likely to sanction each other (2006). Although their findings are not robust to alternative
specifications, its potential warrants inclusion in the model.1 We code observations 1 if the dyad
shares an alliance and 0 if not, based on information obtained from the CoW (Correlates of War)
dataset (Gibler and Sarkees 2004). Third, the United States is the initiator of the majority of
sanctions since 1970, for reasons not completely unrelated to our theory. Most of the sanctions
literature includes a dummy variable controlling for the United States specifically for statistical
analysis. We cast a wider net given our interest in receiver as well as sender characteristics.
Consequently, we control for the influence of major powers given their unique geopolitical
1

Removing alliances from the model does not influence the results reported here.
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positions and interests in ordering the global economy using the Correlates of War definition.
Two dummy variables are included in the model, one each for sender and receiver, coded 1 if the
state is a major power.
Fourth, regime type plays an important role in the sanctioning behavior of states. In
particular, sanctions are viewed as humane alternatives to militarized conflict with particular
appeal to audiences in democracies. As a result, democracies are more likely to employ
sanctions in pursuit of political or social goals (Cox and Drury 2006). We include regime type
with Polity IV scores which scales autocracy and democracy from -10 to 10 with higher values
representing most democratic regimes (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2007). Polity scores are
included for both sender and receiver states in a dyad. Fifth, membership in intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs) provides alternative means of conflict resolution for member states.
Consequently, fewer sanctions might be expected the more states share organizational
membership with each other. That said, however, organizations also provide forums with which
sanctioning states can gain support and collective action (Abbot and Snidal 1998). We include a
variable capturing the number of IGOs of which states in a dyad are both members obtained from
the Correlates of War (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004).
Sixth, large economies are better able to weather sanctions given their relatively bigger
domestic markets. This likely influences both sending and receiving behaviors. Large
economies may be more apt to apply sanctions because the cost is lower. Likewise, they may be
targeted less given their ability to withstand sanctions. Because this influence is largely
independent of our theory, we control for it as a competing explanation using aggregate GDP
figures from the World Penn Tables (Heston, Summers, and Atten 2009). GDP figures are
included for both states in the dyad. Because GDP is highly skewed, it is logged for statistical
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analysis. With similar logic, more robust trading states, in terms of the magnitude of external
trade, are likely more insulated from the negative effects of sanctions than less robust trading
states. It is also important to control for the alternative explanation that the scale of bilateral
trade influences sanctions rather than the degree of monadic trade ties. To this end, we control
for trade dependence in a dyad with the level of bilateral trade between states relative to
economic size (exports + imports / GDP) for both sender and receiver states. Trade data comes
from the Correlates of War (Barbieri, Keshk, Pollins 2008).

Estimation and Results
In total, the dataset includes approximately 425,000 observations once missing data is
taken into account. Because our dependent variable is dichotomous, we use logistic regression
with robust standard errors for our statistical analysis. All independent variables are also lagged
one year to ensure the proper temporal relationship is reported. Overall, our analysis includes
three models. The first model pools all sanctions episodes together regardless of motivation or
intent. The subsequent two models disaggregate sanctions into sanctions for economic and
political reasons separately. Disaggregating sanctions allows more detailed inference into the
actual process of economic coercion used by states.
---- Table 1 Approximately Here ---Table 1 includes descriptive statistics for all variables. Sanctions, either economic or
political, are a relatively rare phenomenon in the international system given that less than 1% of
dyads contain an episode. Given its rarity, we also used rare events logistic regression developed
by King, Tomz, and Zeng to estimate results (King, Tomz, and Zeng 1999). The outcomes of the
rare events logistic model, however, were identical to standard logit. Turning to our primary
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independent variable of interest, centrality, the average state maintains trade ties with
approximately ¾ of states in the world. Furthermore, centrality is roughly normally distributed,
although a spike occurs near 100% where states have trade ties with every other state
individually. As for the other variables in the model, the overwhelming majority of dyads are
non-allies and non-major powers while the continuous variables exhibit a wide range of values.2
Table 2 contains the results of logit estimations for economic, political, and pooled
sanctions. Consider first the pooled model that includes all sanction threats or impositions
regardless of sender motivations. The simple centrality measures for both sender and receiver
are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that more central states are less likely to both
send and receive sanctions. However, the polynomial term is positive and significant indicating
that a state’s probability of either sending or receiving sanctions increases exponentially with
centrality. This generally supports our theory that central states are more vested in the
maintenance of global economic norms and, therefore, their enforcement. Furthermore, they are
also more likely to be sanctioned once they are perceived to stray from the accepted standards.
---- Table 2 Approximately Here ---Some interesting results emerge once the dependent variable is disaggregated into
economic and political sanctions. In the economic sanctions model, only the centrality of the
sending state achieves statistical significance. As with the pooled model, simple centrality is
negative while the polynomial term is positive, indicating that propensity to sanction increases
exponentially with the centrality of the state. The characteristics of the receiver, in turn, do not
have a statistically noteworthy relationship on economic sanctions. These results suggest that
highly central states occupy unique and important roles in the international economy as the
2

Although capabilities exhibit somewhat of a skewed distribution, substituting a logged term in the model
does not change the results reported in this paper.
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enforcers of the liberal economic regime. The fact that the receiver state’s centrality is
statistically irrelevant implies the outward expansion of these norms from the central core to
more peripheral states. Furthermore, this lack of significance, and implicitly lack of regard for
the potential ability of sanctions to inflict significant harm on an opponent, points to the use of
sanctions as a signaling tool by central states in an effort to enforce norms without resorting to
potentially more destabilizing tactics.
Turning to political sanctions, both the characteristics of sender and receiver influence the
threat or imposition of sanctions. The results for the political sanctions model generally mirror
the pooled model. The simple centrality term is negative and significant while the polynomial
term is positive and significant, indicating that the propensity to both sanction and be sanctioned
increases exponentially with centrality. Consistent with our theory, being political leaders,
highly central sender states shape the global normative landscape. This includes not just liberal
economic principles, but also notions of political conduct and acceptability. They are also more
apt to be sanctioned, however, given their implicit membership in the economic core.
Furthermore, the sheer number of trade ties means economic coercion is more frequently on the
menu of policy options for central states vis-à-vis the world. Central states can also more easily
divert trade to other partners, thus lowering the overall impact of sanctions and, consequently,
increasing their appeal as tools of political coercion. Correspondingly, because they are less
affected by sanctions, the primary purpose of sanctions against central states for political reasons
is signaling deviation from accepted political behavior.
Substantive effects of the key independent variables are depicted in Figures 1 through 3.
Each graph plots the predicted probability of sanctions within a dyad as a function of either
sender or receiver centrality. The distribution of values on centrality is also included using
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histograms. Consider economic sanctions – Figure 1 – first. Although it is difficult to discern,
the confidence intervals given by the dashed lines do not contain zero at any point over the
graph, meaning the results are statistically significant over the range of phenomenon. That said,
however, sender centrality does not significantly influence the probability of threatening or
imposing sanctions until a state trades with approximately 80% of the world. After this, the state
presumably possesses a critical mass of trade ties that both partially shield it from negative
consequences and indicate a vested interest in shaping the global economic regime.
Consequently, its probability of sending sanctions increases relatively rapidly from almost zero
to approximately 0.8% probability of imposing sanctions on another state irrespective of receiver
characteristics.
---- Figure 1 Approximately Here ---Turning to Figures 2 and 3, which plot the predicted probability of political sanctions in a
dyad given sender and receiver centrality respectively, the same general pattern is revealed with
some slight deviation. First, the results are significant across the entire sample since the
confidence interval does not include zero in either figure. Second, centrality does not
significantly influence the probability of sending political sanctions until it reaches relatively
high values (approximately 80%). At this critical mass of centrality, however, the state has both
significant opportunity and willingness to sanction others for political reasons. Indeed, the
probability of sanctioning for political reasons grows from almost zero to over 0.3% between
80% and 100% centrality. The influence of receiver centrality, however, is more complicated
and less obvious. While more central receivers are more likely to be sanctioned, the effect is
very mild through the range of observed values. The most central states having trade ties with all
other possible partners is only slightly more likely to be sanctioned than what might be
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considered peripheral states. Consequently, it appears that political sanctions are more
influenced by the dynamics of the sending state – i.e., potential costs, signaling resolve, global
leadership, etc. – than potential targets.
---- Figures 2 and 3 Approximately Here ---Looking briefly at the other variables in the models, several interesting results emerge.
Alliances, GDP, and shared IGO membership influence sanctions uniformly across the models.
Allies, in general, are more likely to sanction each other than non-allies, potentially lending
credence to the use of sanctions as an alternative to war. Likewise, larger economies are more
likely to both sanction and be sanctioned, which might be expected given the opportunity and
willingness argument posed here. Interestingly, shared membership in IGOs decreases the
probability of sanction episodes. This may reflect the ability of IGOs to resolve conflict without
coercive tactics being employed. Capabilities are only relevant for economic sanctions and
actually decrease the likelihood of their use. Military threats may be less costly and more
effective as disparities in capabilities grow. Some interesting patterns are revealed by the
democracy variable as well. In general, the more democratic a state, the less likely it is to
sanction for political reasons, suggesting normative tendencies of non-interference in other
states. That said, democracy has no influence on economic sanctions. Trade dependency is only
relevant for economic sanctions, indicating that more trade dependent states are more likely to
both sanction and be sanctioned. Dependent states have strong interests in managing bilateral
trade relations, potentially leading them to more aggressive tactics. Likewise, being more
vulnerable, economic sanctions are more likely to work against dependent states. Finally, major
powers are less likely to sanction and be sanctioned for economic reasons. However, they are
more likely to sanction for political reasons.
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Conclusion
We have argued that central states use economic sanctions to enforce international norms.
Although sanctions are often ineffective at changing the policy behavior of the receiver of a
sanction, they can be useful as signals. Sanctioning the violator of a norm strengthens the norm
and may change long run behavior, if not immediate behavior. Previous explanations, however,
have failed to consider an important aspect of these interactions. Simple monadic or even dyadic
analyses cannot account for the many relationships among the various actors in the international
system. Using network analysis we have argued that there are particular states which are more
likely to see sanctions as a useful tool. We also argued that the states most likely to punish
violations are those with the greatest interest in maintaining and promoting international regimes,
namely the central states in a given network. We find empirical support for our arguments;
central states impose more than their share of sanctions against other states.
While this paper makes significant progress in understanding how and why sanctions are
used in the international system, there is still more research to be done. Future research should
focus on the next step of the relationship we have studied here. Our argument indicates that
states imposing sanctions may be focused on long run behavior rather than immediate changes in
the foreign policy of sanction recipients. The next step, then, is to examine whether a sanction on
a particular issue affects how states behave in subsequent iterations. In other words, after having
been sanctioned for violating a norm, do states continue to violate that norm?
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Table and Figures

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variables
Militarized Disputes

Sanctions

Frequency
Percentage

Economic
0 (No)
1 (Yes)
425,369
565
99.86
0.14

Political
0 (No)
1 (Yes)
425,613
321
99.92
0.08

Independent Variables

Allies
Major Power

Centrality (%)
Capabilities Ratio
Democracy
Trade Dependency
GDP ($ Billion)
IGO Membership

0 (No)
1 (Yes)
0 (No)
1 (Yes)
Mean
75.012
23.477
0.970
0.003
178.000
27.460

Frequency
Percentage
390,934
91.78
35,000
8.22
406,468
95.43
19,466
4.57
Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
74.667
17.110
9.346
100.000
1.000
209.720
<0.001 16,527.000
1.000
7.690
-10.000
10.000
<0.001
0.029
0.000
7.031
24.700
607.000
0.600
9,220.000
26.000
11.560
0.000
107.000

Note: Total observations = 425,963; Centrality, Democracy, GDP, and dependency scores include
identical statistics for both “A” and “B” variables according to direction of the dyad; GDP is logged for
statistical analysis
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Table 2: Sanction Episodes and the Centrality of Aggrieved Parties

Centralityreciever
Centralitysender
2

Centrality

2

Centrality

reciever

sender

Allies

All Sanctions
-0.128***

Economic Sanctions
0.080

Political Sanctions
-0.110***

(0.015)

(0.066)

(0.017)

-0.133***

-0.168***

-0.091***

(0.015)

(0.045)

(0.023)

0.001***

-0.001

0.001***

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.000)

0.001***

0.001***

0.001***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.001)

1.714***

1.979***

0.964***

(0.095)

(0.124)

(0.162)

-0.025**

6.59 e-05

(0.000)

(0.009)

(0.000)

-0.027***

-0.001

-0.051***

(0.006)

(0.010)

(0.009)

0.018**

0.044***

0.009

(0.006)

(0.013)

(0.048)

0.673***

0.977***

0.445***

(0.034)

(0.053)

(0.484)

0.887***

1.303***

0.423***

(0.045)

(0.065)

(0.053)

-0.027***

-0.034***

-0.029***

(0.002)

(0.004)

(0.005)

1.041***

1.633***

0.570

(0.166)

(0.202)

(0.309)

1.356***

2.564***

0.778

(0.148)

(0.332)

(0.413)

-0.083

-0.452**

0.299

(0.113)

(0.154)

(0.201)

0.462***

-0.584***

1.949***

(0.116)

(0.151)

(0.182)

-36.174***

-63.478***

-21.161***

(1.596)

(3.724)

(1.787)

425,934
-3,827.18
0.405
------

425,613
-1,959.43
0.554
4,867.94***

425,369
-2,154.73
0.208
1,134.19***

-05

6.12 e
Capratio
Democracyreciever
Democracysender
logGDPreciever
logGDPsender
IGO
Dependencyreciever
Dependencysender
Major Powerreciever
Major Powersender
Constant

Dependent
is the presence
of sanctions in
a dyad; Estimates
produced
using logistic
regression;
Figure variable
1: Economic
Sanction
Probability
and
Sender
Centrality
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001

.01

.012

N
Log-Likelihood
Pseudo-R2
χ2
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0

.002

.004

.006

.008

0.01

.012

Figure 2: Political Sanction Probability and Sender Centrality
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Figure 3: Political Sanction Probability and Receiver Centrality
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